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ABSTRACT
Sargent and Wallace (S—W) show that, even when inflation is prima
fade a strictly monetary phenomenon ——pricesare flexible, markets
clear and velocity is constant ——inflationis, in the long run, a
fiscal phenomenon. This follows from the government budget constraint
and the existence of an upper bound on the real per capita stock of
interest bearing public debt held by the private sector. Together
these ensure that in the long run the growth of the money stock is
governed by the fiscal deficit, if we assign to the fiscal authorities
the role of Stackelberg leaders and to the monetary authorities that of
Stackelberg followers.
The discussion of the formal S—W model focuses on the distinct
roles of public spending and explicit taxes in their model and on the
possibility that optimal policy involves public sector surpluses and a
net credit position of the public sector vis—a—vis the private sector.
It is also argued that the specification of the demand for and supply of
money is ad hoc, a weakness shared by most existing macro models.
Finallyit is shown that if we adjust the published government
deficit figures for the effect of inflation on the real value of the stock
ofnominal government debt (as should be done to obtain a deficit measure
appropriate to the S—W model), the inflation—adjusted government deficit
has been in balance or surplus in the U.K. in recent years. If the
deficit is in addition adjusted for the cycle (as it should be to relate
ittothe full employmentS—W model), the government has beena
sizeablenet lender. If we then also subtract net public sector
capital formation from total public spending (assuming implicitly that
thereal rate of return on public sector investment equals the real
rate of return on public sector debt), we get the inflation—corrected,
cyclically adjusted government current account deficit. This is the
deficit measure of the S—W model. This "deficit" has been a sizeable
surplus in recent years and is likely to remain so in the future.
The inflation tax implied by extrapolation of the past and present
stance of fiscal policy is therefore a "deflation subsidy." The
credibility of the Thatcher government's anti—inflationary policy should
therefore,ifthe S—W frameworkis correct, not have been undermined by
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1. Introduction
The paper by Sargent and Wallace [1981], (henceforth S-W),
establishes the proposition that in the long run inflation is always
and everywhere a fiscal phenomenon.This result is derived by
constructing a model in which inflation is a strictly monetary
phenomenonand showing, through the government budget constraint
and the existence of an upper bound on the real percapita stockof
interest—bearingpublic sector debt held by the private sector, that,
in the long run, the rate of growth of the money stock is governed
by the fiscal deficit.My comments on the paper fall into three
parts.Section 2 takes as given the formal specification of the
model and discusses some features of the model and its solution
that were not emphasized by S-w.This includes the need to emphasize
the distinct roles of public spending and explicit taxes and the
possibility that the government will run surpluses and/or be a net
creditor to the private sector.
Section 3 scrutinizes the specification of the model, which is
argued to be ad hoc in the sense thatitprovides no acceptable
microfoundations for the demand for and supply of money and does not
offer a satisfactory account of the role of money in the economy.
While it is no worse on this account than alternative ad hoc models
of money and growth, it is also no better.
Section 4 discusses three adjustments that must be made to the
commonly published public sector deficit figures in order to relate
1/ only the constant velocity version of the model is considered.- 1A-
themto the deficit in the sense of the S-W model.First a
correction must be made for the effect of inflation on nominal
interest rates (and hence on the debt service component of the
deficit) and on the real value of outstanding stocks of nominal
public sector interest-bearing debt.Second, a cyclical correction
is required to eliminate trarsitory increases and decreases in the
deficit that will cancel each other out over a full cycle.A third
correction is necessary because the S—W deficit is a deficit on the
public sector consumption or current account.Published deficit data,
such as the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) in the U.K.
include borrowing for public sector capital formation.
It is shown that the inflation-adjusted government deficit,
obtained by subtracting from the measured deficit the reduction due to
inflation in the real value of the outstanding stock of nominally
denominated interest—bearing public sector debt, has been in balance
or in surplus in the U.K. during recent years.If the deficit is in
addition adjusted for the cycle (as it should be to relate it to the
full employment S-W model), the government has been a sizeable net
lender to the private sector (and the rest of the world) in the past
few years. Data on net public sector capital formation are hard to
come by and estimates of the real rate of return on public sector
investment are highly speculative.The sign of the adjustment
requiredto get from the PSBR to the government current ac.ount deficit—2—
is hardly in doubt, however.On the assumption that net public
sector capital formation has been positive and that the real rate
of return on such investment has also been positive, the public
sector current account surplus (deficit) will have been larger
(smaller) than the PSBR.Given the favourable prospects for
North Sea oil tax revenues (and barring massive changes in the
stance of fiscal policy), the long-run prospect for the inflation-
corrected, cyclically adjusted public sector deficit suggests large
and continuing surpluses.The past, present and prospective
future stance of fiscal policy is therefore conducive, in the S—W
framework, to a sizea.ble and sustainable reduction in the rate of
inflation. The problems of the Thatcher government in achieving
a rapid and significant deceleration of inflation can therefore
not, following the logic of the S-W approach, be attributed to a
failure to support monetary stringency with an appropriate fiscal
policy and the "credibility" of the Medium Term Financial Strategy
(MTFS) cannot have been undermined by large inflation-adjusted
cyclically corrected public sector current account surpluses.
2.Some technical aspects of the S—W model
It is instructive to make one change in the presentation of the
S-W model.From the paper it isn't very clear what the separate roles of—3—
publicspending, G, andexplicit taxes, T,are, as theanalysis is
conducted almost entirely in terms of the defit, 0 =G—T.In
fact all variations in the deficit in the paper are due to variations
in G, since after-tax per capita endowments and Sareconstant
andreal income is assumed to grow at the constant rate of population
growth n.Theanalysis also appears to be conducted on the
asst.unption that 0 and B are positive —-a.nunnecessary restriction.
Let r1(t) be the percapitataxonthe young poorand r2(t)
the percapita taxonthe young rich. and S are the per capita
endowments(before tax) of the young poor and the young rich
— 1 — 2 respectively.Thus i= — t (t)and 5=- r(t)
The S-W modelcannow be reproduced as follows.
(la) 0(t) =H(t)—H(t—1)+B(t)—B(t—l)(1+R) t1
(lb) D(t) G(t) —T(t)
(lc) T(t)N1(t) r1(t) +N2(t)r2(t)
B(o) andH(l) are predetermined
H(t)o
Thepoor can only hold money balances as a store of value.They





- 1. j.ci-r(t) —-r(t)— c(t)=
Therich can hold bonds andcapitalandwilldo so as long as <1+R






























Iotethatpublic spending is intrinsically useless inthemodel,
as it does not enter as an argument in private utility functions and
playsno role elsewhere in the model.Anyefficient solutionwill
therefore require G(t) =ofor all t This can be seen by noting,
from equation (6) that G(t)simply reduces the total amountof
resourcesavailable for consumption or capital formation.Changes in
public financing methods (borrowing, money creation and explicit
taxation) for a given trajectory of public spending, will alter the
time paths of private consumption and capital formation in ways that
cannot necessarily be ranked by the Pareto criterien.Consider on
the other hand two trajectories for public spending, {G'(t)Iand
{G3(t)}to, 1, ....withCt(t)G(t) for all t and
G(t) >G3(t)for some t .Itwill always be possible to use the
taxation,borrowing and money creation mechanism inorder to achieve
aPareto-superior solution trajectory (startingfromthesame initial
conditions) with the public spending programme (G3(t)}-6-
Themeaning of optimalpolicy isnot unambiguousina modelwhich
has suchimportant distributional features, both between and within
generations, as the S-W model.It is, however, easy to show that it
is possible for the authorities to replicate the solution that would
begenerated ifthere were no governmentandbothrich and poor had
accessto the productive storage technology andthecapital market.
Withoutgovernment (B(t) G(t)=r1(t)r2(t)=0(t)=0 for
all t ), and with equal access of both rich andpoor to the storage
technoltgy and the capital market, the solution, which is stationary,









(9) K(t) =N(t).+ P12(t)
In the S-li model, described by equations Cl) -(7),where the
poor have no access to the storage technology or the capital market,
this solution can beduplicated asfollows.





This will generate a rate of decline in the general price level
given by
(11) 1 +R
The real. rate of return from holding money balances is the same as
that obtainable from holding bonds andapital.1Consider equations
(3) and (9) .Witht2(t) o ,thecapital stock of equation (9)
will only be held in the S-W mode].if
(12) B(t) —
N1(t)
The government is a net creditor to the rich citizens in theprivate
sector.Of course the government is a net debtor to thepoor citizens,
who hold its non interest-bearing monetary debt.Since =
N1(t).
and
B(t) =-N1(t) -thegovernment is neither a debtor nor a creditor to
the private sector as a whole.
The richare indifferent between holding bonds-cum-capital and holding
money when the rate of inflation is —R.For convenience we assume
that in that case they in fact choose to hold bonds and capital.If
we don't makethisassumption, the rate of decline of the general price
level merely needs to be an arbitrarily small amount less than R
Note that a rate of deflation greater than R would cause bothpoor and
rich to want to hold only money as a store of value.No solution would
exist, since rich private agents would wish to borrow infinite amounts
from the government (at a rate R) to invest inmoney balances.-8—
UsingT1(t) =0i =1,2, and equations (10), (12) and (2),
thebudgetconstraint can be written as:
G(t)=-
+(R-n)
N1(t) 1+n 2 1+n) 2
As expected, therefore, we require G(t)o ,forall t
Substituting r1(t) =o,i1, 2 into (7a, b, c and d) and using
(U) we have replicated (8a, b c andd).Substituting (12) into
(3) we obtain (9).
The government is a net creditor to the privatesector in




N1(t-l) -.Itlends out an additional.
n Ct-i)itokeep constant its real percapitastockof loans to
1 2
the private sector.The remainderof itsinterest income,
(R-n) N1(t-i.)is usedtoreduc, the ney supply, i.e.
(13)R(t) a(n-R)N1(t-1)
Thisinducesa rateofinflation of -R
Thebudgetis balanced (Do) and the inflation tax" isin fact
an deflation subsidy.Government lending "crowds in" private capital
formation.-9—
This simple example can be generalized in many directions.
It is clear that Pareto—optimal policies wifl. always involve a
proportional rate of decline in the price level of R,thusmaking
availableto all private agents intertemporal market terms of trade
equalto the technological intertemporal terms of tradefor the
economyas a whole.Also, withthe capital market imperfection
andtechnological constraint imposed onthe poorin themodel,there
typically will be toolittle accumulation of physicalcapital.
From equation (3) this can be remedied either by the government
actingas a net lender (B (t) <o)and/or by making transfer
payntents to the rich (t2(t) c0) .Governmentspending is always
wasteful--asignificant shortcoming of the model.Itis
surprising that the analysisin the paperisfocussed on deficits,
public sector debt, taxes and inflation, when the logic of the model
surpluses,
suggests public sector1credit, subsidies and deflation. Apparently
thegovernment is the only agent in the model thatisn'toptimizing.
3.The micro foundations of the demand for andsupplyof money inthe S-W paper
ta spite of its pri4,iafacie foundationon iaicroeconcmic optimizing
behaviour, the S-Wmodelisadhoc.Foroptimizing foundations to be
acceptable, boththeobjective functions and the constraint sets
mustmake sense.The authors do not comait the cardinal, sin in- 10-
monetarytheory ofincluding money as an argumentinthedirect
utility function.Moneyin their model is wanted notfor its own
sake butfor thepurchasingpower over commodities thatit represents.
Sincetheydo not model a transactions role for money -—whichis the
onlyway to represent what is meantbya monetary economy andthe
onlyway to make monetary theory differentfrom standard portfolio
theory —theyare faced with the problem of generating a demandfor
moneyas a store of value only.By not including nominally
denominatedinterest-bearing debt in the portfolio available to
private agents,theyavoid creating a situation in whichmoneyis
always dominated as a store of value.However, money will be a
dominated asset whenever the rate of decline in theprice level is
lessthan R.
To obtain a positive demand formoney when -t+l
—t/t+i
<R
a number of arbitrary restrictions are imposedonthe ability of
private agents to maice mutually advantageouzexchanges.it is not
sufficientto assume that only the rich haveendowmentslargeenough
tohave access to the productivestorage technology.The poor could
simply pool their resources and achieve the minimalscalerequired
for operating the technology.Alternatively,even a single poor
agentcouidmake his resourcesavailable to a rich person for
investment.Such perceived opportunitiesformutuallyadvantageous— 11—
tradeare ruled out by legislative fiat.The same holds for the
purchase of government bonds by the poor.Basically, the poor
hold money because the government tells them they cannot hold
anything else.If such arbitrary restrictions on exchange are
acceptable, disequilibrium macroeconomics of the Barro-Grossman
variety would be safe from the criticism of ad hocceryf
A further difficulty arises when one tries to relate the properties
of the asset H (high-powered money) in the model to money in the real.
world.Money is whatever is generally acceptable as a medium of
exchange.It is a property of assets, and not to be identified in a
permanent or policy-invariant way, with the particular asset or class of
assets that possess this property (to a greater or lesser degree) in a
given time and place.In the model money is controllable because money is
H and H is controllable.In the real world the set of assets representing
money varies across time arid space in respone to the optimizing choices
of households, corporations, financial institutions and governments.
Sometimes such choices are conscious public choices, as when a certain
class of objects is declared legal tender, but more often the
"moneyness of existing assets changes gradually and spontaneously and
newmonies are created in response to perceived changes in profit
opportunities.
Mostmoneyto-day isinsidemoney.The monetarybass,notes
and coin in circulation outside the Bank of England plus bankers'— 12—
balanceswith the BankofEngland is, at just over £11 billion in
1980, onlyonethird of Ml andone sixth of £M3(which ofcourse
includes financial claims that do nothave the mediumofexchange
property).Table1.showsthat the inflation taxis avery small
revenue raiser indeed.
Table ITheinflation tax andexplicittaxreceipts
**
Monetary
* Retail General InflationInflation
base price index governmenttax tax
1975=100 percentagetax receiptsreceiptsreceipts increase a) b) ****
£million on year £ million £ million£ million
earlier
1975 6,413 100.0 24.2 38,547 799 1,552
1976 7,198 116.5 16.5 44,709 785 1,188
1977 7,982 135.0 15.8 51,004 784 1,261
1978 9,181 146.2 8.3 56,682 1,199 762
1979 10,405 165.8 13.4 67,912 1,224 1,394
1980 11,224 195.6 18.0 83,271 819 2,020
*:Notesand coin in circulation outside the Bank of England;
annual averages; Source,B0EQB.
**:Source,EconontjcTrends.
:Generalgovernment receipts frostaxes,national insurance and
contributions etc. Source, Econo..ic Trends.
Change in the monetary base.
*****: Monetarybase x(% increase in retail price index/100].— 13—
Whetherone measures the inflation tax as the increase in the
monetary base or as the rate of inflation times the outstanding
monetarybase -—thetwo will, only be equivalent if money is
neutral in the short run -—,theinflation taxisa very minor source
of government revenue.
It is essential to be verycarefulabout theidentificationof
the real world counterparts of the theoretical construct H (orM)
in macroeconomic models.I do not for one moment believe that
inflation would becuredpermanently by tight control over the rate of
growthof the monetary base and a compatible fiscal deficit.It
flies in the face of what we know about the profit-seeking behaviour
of private financial institutions and the transactions costs
minimizing behaviour of private households and firms.The Lucas
critique applies to the supply of and demand for money as much as to
other aspects of economic behaviour.
the rate of inflation plus the natural rate of growth of the economy
timthemonetarybase.
1again ignoringreal.growth.— 14—
4.The inflation—corrected, cyclically adjusted public sector current
account deficit
Theformal model is specifiedin terms ofrealdebt andreal rates
of return.Since all of U.S. government interest-bearing debt and most
of the U.K. 's government bonds are not indexed, we must adjust the
nominal government deficit for the effect of inflation on nominal
interestrates.In termsofequation (la), the deficit becomes




For simplicity all bonds are assumed to be one period bonds with
a fixed money price of unity. Bisthe nominalstockof bonds
issuedat time t anddue in periodt+]. .R1isthenominal.
interest rate on bondsissued in period t—1
With the model's assumption of a fixed real.interestrate R and





(15) R_1 R +pt_pt_i
In pQZ' capitaterms,the real valu, of the deficit is therefore
(16)_.!..
-
B — B_1(l+p)-B_1 (o —
p ztpt fl pt—i— 15—
Itisclear thattheinterest payments due to inflation
B1 areexactly matched by the reduction in the real
1
valueof the stock of outstanding nominal,interest-bearingpublic
debtdue to inflation.The flow of funds accounts, of which the
public sector deficit is a part, record the higher government
interestpayments associated with higher inflation but do not record
the capital gains accruing to the government on its outstanding debt.
Itis theinflation-corrected deficit thatwill,as Sargent and
Wallace point out, havetobe financed in the long run by the
infLation tax.That part of the measured deficit thatmerelyreflects
the effect of higher inflation on nominal interest rates does not
represent a real burden to be financed either by explicit or implicit
taxes.By noting that the real stockofbonds isgivenby
—, weimmediately obtain Sargent and Wallace equation (3) from
our equation (16): the behaviour of the real. pox' capitastockof
government bonds is independent (in this perfect foresight classical
model) of whether the bonds are indexed or not.When th. rate of
inflation is positive, the measured deficit overstates the aaunt of
financial "crowding out", i.e. the extent to which the public sector
competeswiththe private sector for invastibla resources.In a
steady state, when all real. par capitaassetStOCkS are constant, we— 16—
DBn f\ H have CR-n) -=
4.fl)j—
Theamountof revenue prcapttatobe raised in the steady state by
theinflation tax is +(R-n)4j',not +
(R
+- n)
Table2 shows the Bank of England's figures for the inflation—
corrected PSER.It represents an attempt to approximate what the
measuredPSBR would be ifall government interest-bearing debtwere










Nominal£ billion 0.9 1.1 7.0 7.8 12.6 12.3
PSBR % ofNNP 2.4 2.0 8.6 6.2 7.5 6.2
Inflation£ billion — 1.5 — 3.0 —8.3 —7.7 —13.9 —12.1
adjustment% of 1P— 3.8 — 5.7 —10.2 —5.5 —8.2 —6.1.
Inflation£ billion — 0.6 — 1.9-1.3 0.]. —1.3 0.2 corrected % ofMNP— 1.4 — 3.7 —1.6 0.7 —0.7 0.1.
PSB R— 17—
inflationinto the parvalue (not themarket value)of the outstanding
stock of interest-bearing nominal debt.Parvalues rather than market
values are used because some of the variation in market values will be
due to changes in realinterestrates.!' The adjustmenare crude and
somewhatsensitive to the choice of price index, timeperiod etc.The
orders of magnitude areboundto be correct, however.The inflation
correction is large and suffices in most years to turn a measured
deficitinto an inflation-corrected surplus. 2_'Evenin1980 the
inflation-corrected bidget was roughly in balance.Table 2 seems to
suggest that it isn't easy for any government to run a "real" deficit.
The same picture of a long sequence of inflation—corrected surpluses
emerges from Table 3 which showsthebehaviour of the debt-income ratio
(the ratio of publicsector interest-bearing debt tonationalincome).
Some of the variation in the debt—income ratio is attributable to
cyclical deviation of output from capacity output.This is e.g. likely
to be the case in 1981.
The S-Wmodel isaclassical "full employment" model.The
relevant deficit figure is therefore notmerelyinflation-corrected
but also cyclically adjusted.Givenspending progranues and tax and
!"The presence of long—dated debt complicates the inflation adjustment.
Only if there is perfect foresight wil]. the inflation correction for
multi-period bonds be the same as for the single-period bonds
considered in equations (14) and (16).
2/
A very similar pictureemerges when onecalculates the inflation—
adjusted government deficit for theU.S.— 18—
1/ Table3Public sector debt relative to national income —




1948 25,620.8 2.510 1.109
1949 25,167.6 2.395 1.057
1950 25,802.3 2.241 1.053
1951 25,921.6 2.045 .971
1952 25,890.5 1.896 .887
1953 26,051.2 1.742 .865
1954 26,583.0 1.663 .869
1955 26,933.7 1.587 .842
1956 27,038.9 1.468 .805
1957 27,007.5 1.383 .776
1958 27,232.0 1.336 .759
1959 27,376.3 1.280 .758
1960 27,732.6 1.218 .760
1961 28,252 1.160 .749
1962 28,674 1.120 .730
1963 29,347.6 1.094 .744
1964 30,226.3 1.022 .730
1965 30,440.6 .964 .701
1966 31,340.7 .937 .695
1967 31,935.6 .907 .691
1968 34,193.9 .909 .706
1969 33,984.2 .847 .666
1970 33,079.4 .750 .610
1971 33,441.9 .670 .564
1972 35,839.9 .642 .564
1973 36,919.6 .563 .532
1974 40,657.0 .533 .503
1975 46,403.7 .490 .464
1976 56,585.2 .503 .486
1977 67165.8 .532 .498
1978 79,479.9 .546 .544
1979 86,884.8 .530 .524
1980 95,314.2 .493 .487
Dec 17 1981 LL2,780t
1/
Nationaldebt: nominal aunt outstanding at 31 March in each year
£ million.
Excludes debt created by the Northern IrelandExchequerand government
guaranteed sterlingloansand stocks; Source: Annual Abstract.
Source for C2PandRPI: Economic Trends.
t provisional (as at July 81).
*usingestimated RPI (assuming in.fI.ation Oct-Dec. same as Sept.).— 19—
transferschedules, a cyclical departure of output below its full
employment or normal capacity utilization level will be associated
with an increase in the PSBR above its average value over the cycle.
Provided policy remains unchanged and upswings and downswings alternate
in cycles of roughly equal length and emplitude, a cyclical increase in
the PSBR relative to trend during the downswing will be matched, as
regards its effect on the outstanding stock of public sector debt, by
a cyclical decrease relative to trend during the upswing.If we take
the financial years 1978/79 and 1979/80 as representing periods of
normal capacity utilization, the deep slump during financial year
1980-81 may well have been associated with a £7 billion cyclical
increase in the PSBR. Again, while one may quibble with the exact
magnitudes, there can be no reasonable doubt that the inflation-
corrected, cyclically adjusted PSBR has been in quite substantial
surplus during the first two years of the Thatcher experiment.
Government borrowing in the S-W model all consists of public "consumption
loans".There is no public sector capital formation.If instead
part of G consistituted public sector investment and if public sector
capital formation yielded the same rate of return R as private
investment and government debt, then borrowing to finance such
investment would not increase the deficit.The debt incurred to finance
the investment can be serviced exactly from the returns generated by the
public sector investment.While in the S-W model public borrowing
still "crowds out" private sector capital formation On a one—for—one
-"See Buiter and Miller [1981].- 20-
basis,the total (public plus private) capital stock is invariant
under changes in the scale of the bond-financed public sectcr
1/
investment prograxnine
The relevant deficit in the S..W model is therefore the public
sector cons.mption or current account deficit.To obtain this we
should subtract from the PSBR the amount of net public sector capital
formation.
Figures for gross public sector capital formation in recent years
are given in Table 4.Even with the gross figures there are well-known
problems.Some expenditure classified as current in fact belongs (in
part) to the economic category of capital formation, e.g. education.
Errors in the opposite direction also contaminate the data.Even if
we take the gross investment figures at face value, it is very difficult
to come up with an acceptable figure for depreciation.Finaria1
2/
Statistics contains for the financial year 1979/80 an imputed charge for
consumption of non—trading capital for general government which is 27%
of general governnnt gross domestic capital formation.For the
'Since the private capital stock cannot be negative, the totalcapital
stock would increase if a larger public sector capital formation programme
made this constraint binding (i.e. reduced private(gross) investment
to zero)
-"Financial Statistics, CSO,July 1981, Table 2.7.TABLE 4
Public Sector fixed capital formation and PSBR
£ billion, current prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
General Public Total Total PSBR
goverrmient Corporations public public
sector sector
(Gross) (Gross) (Gross) (Net)
1976 5.40 4.69 10.09 6.73 9.13
1977 4.80 4.76 9.56 6.37 6.00
1978 4.61 4.95 9.56 6.37 8.33
1979 5.06 5.57 10.63 7.09 12.59
1980 5.47 6.79 12.26 8.17 12.31
Source: Columns 1, 2 and 5: Economic Trends, July 1981.
Column 4: estimate based on column 4 =xcolumn 3.— 22—
financialyear 1980/81 the corresponding figure is 32%.To get some
idea cf plausible magnitudes I arbitrarily assume that net investment
is two-thirds of gross investment.This is probably rather conservative.
The resulting guestimates for net public sector capital formation are in
Table 4, column 4.Net public sector capital formation even in 1979
accounted for 56% of the PSBR.In 1977 there even was a small current
account surplus. If we simply subtract the figure for net public
sector capital formation from the inflation corrected, cyclically
adjusted deficit we get very sizeable "real", full-employment current
account surpluses for all recent years; the "true" surplus for 1979 is
of the order of £8 billion, and for 1980 amounts to well over £10 billion.
Clearly governienth can borrow to finance public sector
capital formation without the resulting deficit holding any long-run
inflationary threat, as long as the rate of return on the public sector
investment (net of the proportional rate of depreciation) is no less than
the rate of return on the debt issued to finance the investment.To
argueagainst netting the full amount of public sector capital formation
outof the PSBR is to argue that the net rate of return on public sector
investment is less than the marginal cost of borrowing.Indeed, if the
net marginal product of public sector capital is zero, public sector
investment is exactly the kind of wasteful expenditure represented by
G in the S-W model.While the calculation of the net social rate of
!."Note that the PSBR figures are not inflation-corrected or cyclically
adjusted.— 23—
returnon public sector investment is a very important issue, it is
clearly beyond the scope of this paper.
Note that it doesn't matter whether the government directly
appropriates the returns on its investment through charges etc.If
the returns to the public sector investment accrue to theprivate
sector (as is the case with much social overhead capital) thegoverment
could simply levy taxes (in the least distortionary manner) toservice
the debt that financed the investment.Provided the net social yield
on the public investment equals the marginal cost of public sector
borrowing, there will be no monetary and inflationaryconsequences of
such bond—financed public sector investment.
Even if the past behaviour of the "real", full employmentgovernment
current account deficit (or "true" deficit) was consistent with apolicy
of achieving a substantial and sustainable reduction in the rate of inflation,
anticipations concerning the future "true" deficit might still have
prevented such a policy from being successful.It is clearly very hard
to make reasonable conjectures concerning the course of the future"true"
deficit. If after the next election, the incoming government were to
implement a dramatic fiscal reflation there could be a fiveyear period
of substantial "true" deficits.In the absence of such a major policy
reversal, the prospects would seem to favour large "true" surpluses.The
reason is the coming on stream of North Sea oil tax revenue.As the companies
loose the ability to offset their capital costs against taxliabilities,
a major increase in the share of North Sea oil rents appropriated by— 24—
governmentis building up)'
Given the past record of inflation-corrected, full employment
government current account surpluses and with reasonable prospects
for continuing future surpluses the logic of the S-W approach suggests that the
credibility of the MTFS could not have been undermined by a budgetary stance
that is inconsistent with a sustainable reduction in the rate of inflation
as has been argued e.g. in Sargent [1981].Implied in the current plans
for spending and taxation is a large future deflation subsidy, not an
inflation tax.To draw practical implications from the insights
provided by the S-W model we must consider both sides of the public sector
balance sheet: its assets as well as its liabilities.These assets
include the stock of physical public capital and the government's share
of North Sea oil wealth.
!/In Forsyth and Kay [1980], the following illustrative figures are quoted
for total tax revenues from North Sea oil. (Royalties, P.R.T. and
Corporation tax): £bn, 1980 prices.
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
3.0 5.7 7.8 10.0 10.9 11.3— 25—
Conclusion
The S-W paper is a useful reminder of the interdependence of
fiscal and monetary policy through the government budget constraint.
Especially transparent is their modelling of the long-run
implications of the government budget constraint once it is
recognized that there is an upper bound on the real pr capita
stock of interest-bearing public sector debt that the private sector
is willing and able to hold: the "permanent" or long—run real
government current account deficit must be financed by the inflation
tax.The point is of analytical interest even if it is of no
relevance for explaining the persistence of inflation in spite of
restrictive monetary policies in the U.K. (and the U.S.) where recent
and anticipated future inflation—corrected, cyclicallygovernment
current account deficits have been negative.
A potential danger of the del is that byfocussing exclusively
onthe minor role of monetary policy asa revenue—raising mechanism,it
ignoresthe much more importantstabilization role of monetarypolicy.
In an economyLikethe U.K. or the U.S. wherea significantdegree of
nominal"stickiness"exists and persists in wage and price setting
behaviour, conditional or contingent monetary policy rulescan help to— 26—
stabilizethe economy in the face of nominal and real, external and
internal shocks.Such rules can be automatic stabilizers relating
monetary aggregates or interest rates to current, decentralized information
(Buiter (1981 a)) or feedback rules relating monetary instrumants to
past information.While it is possible to construct models in which
deterministic and known monetary feedback rules (but not automatic
monetary stabilizers)have no real effects, the accumulation of
special assumptions required to produce such invariance results
suggests thatinless rarified representations of the economy a
stabilizationrole exists for monetary feedbackpolicy. (Buiter
[1981 b]).
Anespecially unfortunate scenario in a Neo-Keynesian world
would bethe following.In an economy with a high underlying rate
of inflation,monetarydeceleration creates a slump because of
sluggish "core" inflation andothersources of nominalinertia.As
there is no immediate significant effect on the rate of inflation,
nominalinterestrates (at least at the shortend ofthe market) stay
high. Indeed, with a predetermined general price level, nominal
rates
interestL maywellincrease in the shortrun.The measured deficit
now overstates the inflation-corrected, cyclically adjusted deficit
bothbecauseof the persistence of inflation and because of the cyclical— 27—
declinein real economic activity. Incorrect extrapolation of the
current measured deficit suggests incompatibility between the fiscal
stance and a significant and sustained reduction in the rate of
inflation. As a result spending programmes are curtailed and taxes
raised. This further worsens the slump. This scenariomay well
be helpful in understanding the U.K. experience since mid—1979.References
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